flwyd: (mathnet - to cogitate and to solve)
At the end of December I read Visual Thinking by Temple Grandin. Grandin is one of the most famous people with autism, or perhaps it would be better to say that she's one of the people most well-known for having autism. Grandin thinks in pictures, and Visual Thinking draws on her own mind, her experience working with others, and psychological research to talk about three different types of thinking.
  • Object visual thinking involves mental images of specific things or scenes. Thinking about airplanes involves recalling mental images of specific airplanes the person has seen, in person or in a photograph: perhaps a Boeing 737 or a Cessna 182. Temple Grandin is an object visual thinker, and famously designs livestock handling facilities by visualizing what an animal would see from a particular location.
  • Visual-spatial thinking involves thinking in relations, abstractions, and patterns. Thinking about airplanes might involve thinking about the general structure of an airplane—the fuselage connects to wings, the cockpit, tail, etc.—without thinking about any specific plane.
  • Verbal thinking involves words and sequences rather than images. Thinking about airplanes might involve the process of flight: boarding, taxiing, acceleration on the runway, liftoff, and so on.

The book's focus is on visual thinkers, people whose main mode of thought is either object-visual thinking or visual-spatial thinking, particularly the former. People on the autism spectrum are often visual thinkers, though not all visual thinkers are autistic or vice versa and neither has a bright-line diagnostic. As an autistic child, Temple Grandin didn't learn to speak until later than many children, and she struggled in many classes in school because the material was presented for verbal thinkers and folks who could do abstract reasoning. She talks about finally connecting with coursework that made sense to her when she got to shop class, which is about working with physical objects. Another key educational experience was going to a boarding school which involved chores like caring for animals; lacking language, animals are naturally visual thinkers.

Grandin talks about the kinds of work that the three types of thinkers do well. You'll often find object visual thinkers in roles that require hands-on work: mechanics, machinists, drafters, builders, equipment operators, repair people. They're excellent at troubleshooting machinery, and they're able to tinker and build things with whatever supplies may be at hand. Visual-spatial thinkers are often drawn to engineering, mathematics, and computers; they design complex systems and find patterns in the world. Verbal thinkers are, naturally, drawn to work that's focused on words or sequential thinking. Lawyers, politicians, authors, and journalists are often verbal thinkers, and project managers can apply sequential thinking to make sure things happen on time. Grandin likes to talk about how the two types of visual thinkers are complimentary when designing something. Abstract visual thinkers can do all the modeling and calculations to ensure a factory building will be sturdy and that the machinery runs reliably. But a factory designed only by abstract thinkers likely won't run very effectively because they tend to overlook problems in the specific details of things work on the factory floor: the awkward movements a worker needs to do at the assembly line, or poor lighting of a workbench because something's blocking the lamps. Visual-spatial thinkers can make great electrical engineers, but you might want an object visualizer as an electrician. In the software space you might want an object visual thinker for a UI designer, a visual-spatial thinker writing code, and a verbal thinker as product manager, figuring out the user journeys the system will support.

A lot of the book talks about how modern American society is letting object visual thinkers down. A lot of schooling is designed for verbal or abstract thinking, and object visualizers struggle. Grandin reports that object visual thinkers often have a very difficult time with algebra, which they find too abstract and this challenge prevents many people from graduating from high school. However, many of these same people excel at geometry and trigonometry because their visual cortex can make sense of the relationships. "Let students take trigonometry if they fail algebra" might sound weird to folks used to the traditional progression of high school, but it might result in having a lot more Americans who are good at math, at least some parts of it. Grandin highlights George W. Bush's No Child Left Behind Act for making this problem worse: schools are graded and funded based on students' standardized test scores, so the incentive is to focus instruction on what will be tested. There's no standardized test that gives subjects a pile of lumber and a box of tools and asks them to assemble a chair, so when budget cuts come, classes like shop and music get taken away. Colleges and universities tend to make things even more abstract and more verbal, and the availability of trade schools, apprenticeships, and other hands-on education has been dwindling. Companies often have a college degree requirement, not realizing they may be cutting object visualizers out of the employment pool. Grandin decries that the result is an America where we're losing the ability to fix things.

This has political implications, too. (Here I'm building on Temple Grandin's foundation, she doesn't frame the book this way.) There are fewer narratives in American politics stronger than the middle class dream of success. After World War II, a man with no education beyond high school could get a good-paying job as a factory worker, a miner, an auto mechanic, doing appliance repair, or many other roles that object visual thinkers do well. These jobs offered the chance to own a home, raise a family, and enjoy leisure time; a combination that was uncommon for their parents' generation. As the 20th Century drew to a close, and accelerating in the 21st Century, the American economy shifted strongly to jobs that reward abstract or verbal thinking. Globalization sent a lot of the manufacturing jobs to lower-cost countries while domestic production became increasingly automated. (Fun fact: the U.S. is still the world's leading manufacturer, even though we employ a fraction of the manufacturing workforce we once did: American manufacturing is mostly done by machines.) Computers and the Internet gave powerful tools to abstract and verbal thinkers who are able to thrive in a service and information economy. High-tech manufacturing also made hands-on work more difficult: in the 1960s and '70s, buying a Heathkit stereo system and assembling it yourself could save significant money and teach you something useful at the same time, and you could easily fix it if a component failed. Today with high-tech automated assembly and microprocessors running everything, the cost to pay someone to fix a damaged Sonos speaker system is probably higher than the price of buying a new one. Starting in 2015, America saw Donald Trump's messaging resonate with older voters who work in these object visualizing jobs, and especially among voters who identify with such work that's been in decline like coal mining and assembly lines. Should it be any surprise in 2024 that Harris outperformed Trump by 13 points among college-educated voters, but Trump was up 24 points among men without a college degree? Millennials living in their parents' basements and playing video games all day was something of a running joke in the late aughts, but that also describes visual thinkers who've been left out of the modern American social structure and have grown to resent folks who were able to follow the abstract and verbal path through college and the modern hands-off economy.

I'd watched Temple Grandin talk about this book at Google, so I was curious how the ideas of a highly visual thinker would come across in a book, a naturally verbal and sequential medium. At times reading the book felt like listening to Temple Grandin give a talk; she often communicates in specific anecdotes, and related stories recur throughout the book. One of the big themes of the book is how people with different thinking styles can collaborate, and in the book she gives praise to her editor who's able to apply strong verbal thinking to organize the scattered notes and fragments that Temple gives her. This is certainly helpful in making this information about visual thinking accessible to verbal thinkers and readers. I found it interesting, though, that a book which is all about thinking in images and spatial relationships contains 400 pages of words and no photographs, illustrations, or diagrams. As a visual-spatial thinker, I was hoping to see some kind of 2D representation of how a visual thinker might operate. I wonder how many visual thinkers would benefit from learning this information, but get turned off by a book that's nothing but words.

I think I first heard about visual-spatial thinking, as distinct from object visualizing, from a previous Temple Grandin talk. I've considered myself on the autism spectrum for over 20 years, since I learned about Asperger's syndrome. When I heard Temple Grandin explain how her brain works I said "that's definitely not how mine works." While I can build intricate and elegant software systems, I'm perennially bad at building physical things. Cognitive tasks like mentally rotating a cube are challenging for me, but I can visualize a map of the whole world or specific areas, and at talent shows I like to recite every country in the world in geographic order. Unlike many kids with autism I didn't have any trouble learning language, and I always read above grade level. But I think my language use shows signs of spatial and abstract thinking: I've always loved puns, which feel to me like I'm demonstrating a multi-dimensional linkage between words that aren't present in the normal linear version. As a kid I often focused on the literal meaning of a set of words, much to the consternation of verbal thinkers who would say "you know what I mean!" (I still do this as an adult sometimes, but I have four decades of building a database of what people actually mean when they say something that a program would interpret differently.) I also tend to be very long-winded: an excellent verbal thinker can convey an idea without using a lot of words, while I tend to say or write down every sentence that comes to my mind related to a topic. Someone might mention a topic at lunch and I'll spend three minutes talking about all the things I learned from Wikipedia that are tangentially related. This is a bit like reading a map out loud: the river we were talking about touches another river, so let's row up stream and see where that one goes.

It's important for people creating tools and products to design with the different modes of thinking in mind. Much as a product that was designed and tested entirely by right-handed people is likely to be awkward for lefties, a product or process that was designed around the way verbal thinkers operate is likely to be frustrating to visual thinkers. Google Maps is an interesting example here. At the core, the data is inherently spatial: where is everything? But there are ways to expose that data that fit different thinking patterns. If someone wants directions from one place to another, Maps could show a path on a map and instructions like "take 6th Avenue to Broadway and turn south, then turn west on Alameda." This is great for spatial thinkers like me; I might ignore the written instructions entirely and just look at the lines on the map; if I take a different turn I can still reach the destination because I've formed a mental model of the space between here and there. Verbal thinkers might focus on the step-by-step instructions, but when they come to each intersection they'll have to figure out "which way is south?" So instead of cardinal directions, let's use left and right turns. Object visualizers still might have trouble, though: the map is an abstract set of lines and rectangles that can be hard to turn into 3D space, and the turn-by-turn instructions are a bunch of street names and numbers that need to be kept in order: "do I turn on Alameda before Broadway, or is it the other way?" So Google Maps recently added navigation by landmarks: "turn right after the McDonalds" and "turn left at the second traffic light." To get even more context, object visualizers can drop into Street View and see what all the buildings look like at an intersection. This multi-modal approach to directions is a big win over paper maps, when everyone but the spatial thinkers was faced with a daunting puzzle. The old stereotype of a woman in the passenger seat complaining that the man in the driver's seat didn't pull over and ask for directions might have been a conflict between verbal and visual thinking…

I was pleased to learn that object visual thinkers do share a trait with visual-spatial thinkers: we organize things by keeping track of their physical location. It might look like a random pile of papers on a desk to a verbal thinker, but ask a visual thinker to retrieve a particular document and they can probably find it quickly. But if a verbal thinker comes in and tries to be helpful by organizing all the papers into an efficient filing system the visual thinker will be unable to find anything, because it's not where they last put it. These two organization approaches are "piling" and "filing." My coworkers are often confused about how I can manage having 20 browser windows open with 50+ tabs in each. I find it quite easy: each window has a loosely-related theme, and I remember where on the desktop each window sits. When my workstation switched to Wayland, Chrome was unable to restore windows to their original locations when it opened and I was completely flustered; I had to spend 20 minutes a week figuring out which window was which and moving them back to their original location. On the other hand, I always wonder how someone who's only got one browser window open can keep track of what they were working on :-)
flwyd: (earth eyes south america face)
A month or two into the 2020 pandemic lockdown I scanned my bookshelf for something appropriate to read that didn't involve staring at a screen. I found A Paradise Built in Hell: The extraordinary communities that arise in disaster by Rebecca Solnit. Given the novel disaster that the world was collectively experiencing, this seemed a particularly opportune time to read it. As with many new pandemic hobbies, reading this book ebbed and waned, taking until New Year's Day of 2023 to finish it.

The book dives deep into a handful of major physical disasters which struck cities, how the residents in the disaster area responded with creativity and communal support, and how the official response and media coverage assume that people in a disaster engage in anti-social behavior that isn't generally happening. This exploration was inspired by the author's own experience of euphoria and sense of possibility in the aftermath of the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in San Francisco and deepened over the next two decades as she researched the sociology of other disasters and interviewed people who were on the ground, participating in the suddenly created community where many of the social norms from just hours before had fallen away.

She shares writings from survivors of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, highlighting the profound impact it had on Dorothy Day who went on to a life of social activism and anarchism. The ordinary residents of San Francisco quickly improvised solutions to help the community, putting out fires, setting up tents in Golden Gate Park for the suddenly homeless, preparing free meals, and other simple and effective acts of mutual aid. Many firsthand descriptions of the experience describe a joyful time in an odd utopia, where the city collapsed but the community rose up. Solnit contrasts this spontaneous community support network from the elite panic shown by the mayor and the army (based in the Presidio) whose goal was to "save the city from the people." In a refrain that recurs throughout the book, political, military, police, business, and media leaders often focus on looting in disaster situations even though property theft is rarely prominent in such situations. Additionally, the word looting fails to distinguish theft of financially valuable items for personal gain from requisitioning important supplies in an environment where survival is of the utmost importance and the ordinary mechanisms of cash transactions and functioning supply chains are disrupted. Earthquake survivors broke pharmacy windows so they could take medicine for a sick neighbor, an act which should not be conflated with stealing luxury goods for sale in the underground market.

Solnit then explores some unnatural disasters: the 1917 Halifax explosion (the collision of an ammunition ship that stands as the largest non-nuclear explosion), the London Blitz, and nuclear fears in the Cold War. Once again, elite expectations that the public would panic and a large collective of disaster survivors would bring out the worst in humanity did not materialize. The famous scenes of Londoners spending the night on subway platforms as bombs fell and air raid sirens screamed above ground was initially an organic response of ordinary people that surprised the authorities, who only belatedly provided institutional support. Solnit introduces sociologists who found a lack of evidence of panic and social disorder during a natural disaster or military attack, yet politicians still worried about it and Hollywood found crowd panic and a Hobbesian state of nature to be compelling tropes.

Moving forward in time, Solnit dives into the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, writing
One disaster utopia lasted. During the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, citizens discovered each other, their own strength, and the superfluity of what had seemed like an omnipotent and pervasive government, and they did not let go of what they discovered. It reshaped the nation. The real disaster began long before the earthquake, just as the utopia of social engagement and community strength lasted long after.
Here again ordinary citizens suddenly sprang into action, digging their neighbors out from collapsed buildings with no tools or training. Meanwhile the bad deeds of many of the city's elite were exposed, including factory owners (some with military support, again to "prevent looting") who rescued their equipment from collapsed buildings but left their trapped workers to die. Many of the shoddy collapsed buildings were government built, and the official response to the disaster left much to be desired. Citizen groups sprung up from the destruction and persistently demanded change. The whole city could see the incompetence and corruption of the PRI and organized effectively, winning concessions as Mexican civil society began to develop outside the patronage structure of the ubiquitous authoritarian political party.

The next chapter is titled Losing the Mandate of Heaven and expands from the Mexico City earthquake to connect disasters and revolutions.
In some ways a diaster merely brings the existing tensions, conflicts, and tendencies in a society and its government to light or to a crisis point. If the government fails to meet the urgent needs of its people, if it is seen to be self-interested, incompetent, or possessed of interests that serve an elite while sabotaging the well-being of the majority, the upheaval of disaster provides an opportunity to redress this failing that disaster has brought to the light.
The 1755 Lisbon earthquake marked a shift in Portuguese political power and it is usually considered to be one of the starting points of the European Enlightenment, a movement away from authority and religiosity toward individual reason—and doubt. A 1972 earthquake near Managua and the Somoza dictatorship's corruption and focus on personal profit from rebuilding provided the spark which culminated in the Sandinista revolutionaries toppling the government seven years later. And not just earthquakes; bad weather (thanks, Icelandic volcanoes) led to crop failures that were major factors in the French Revolution. Mikhail Gorbachev attributed the Chernobyl disaster as the most important cause of the Soviet collapse of the early 1990s. As in disasters, the chaotic period of a revolution often brings out euphoric feelings, communal connections, and a sense of utopia.

The final third of the book dives into two events in America that many readers think they're quite familiar with: the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina. Rebecca Solnit weaves together many stories in and around New York and New Orleans, reminding the reader of the stories they saw on the news while also introducing them to personal stories which show that the disasters looked a lot different on the ground than they did on TV. While the nation freaked out about the collapsing World Trade Center towers, the people of lower Manhattan remained fairly level headed. Ordinary office workers helped their colleagues out of the burning building, in some cases despite official instructions not to evacuate. In the neighborhoods people were generous and compassionate (despite New York City's reputation for being gruff and impersonal) and without regard for religious, racial, or social divisions. Americans glued to their TV sets that day saw Mayor Rudy Giuliani in picturesque leadership situations, covered in WTC dust along with the evacuees and rescue workers. He was so available for TV in part because he'd insisted on creating New York's emergency operations center at the World Trade Center, rendering it essentially useless in handling New York's biggest emergency. The stories that TV continued to tell about 9/11 had a monumental impact on American society in the weeks and years to come. Aided by elite panic from the government, the media turned 9/11 into a clash of civilizations narrative, of terrorists versus the free Western world, a story that would spike George W. Bush's popularity rating and lead to two decades of destructive foreign policy, America's longest war. If the story had instead been told by the people on the ground in New York, the people who experienced the painful clouds of dust and the generosity of fellow New Yorkers, it could have been a tale of compassion, connection, and good deeds in the face of governmental failure to prepare for an emergency or protect the country from nineteen guys with box-cutter knives.

The final chapters about New Orleans are the most personal and the most gut-wrenching. Rebecca Solnit had already been researching the spontaneous community building and often collective sense of euphoria that occurs after a disaster, and had just published an article in The Nation when Hurricane Katrina pounded the Gulf Coast. Here again are stories of ordinary people helping their neighbors out, a media looking for stories of looting, elite panic, and a government woefully unprepared to handle the disaster and often outright hostile to citizens trying to help solve the problem. In New Orleans the media disaster narrative fed back into the community and built upon over two centuries of racial distrust and injustice. The police chief in predominantly white Gretna prevented people from evacuating to higher ground across the Crescent City Connection bridge. In the predominantly white neighborhood of Algiers Point, a well-armed vigilante group worried about looting, not because of direct evidence but due to the cultural assumption that looting is a natural byproduct of disaster, especially in black areas. This fear led the Algiers Point folks to murder several African Americans, actions which they didn't try to hide but that have gone largely unreported. Solnit does a great job helping the survivors of Katrina tell the stories of these murders in plain view. Looting, as distinct from requisitioning supplies was quite rare after Katrina, perhaps in part because there's not much use stealing an expensive television when your house is under ten feet of water and most of the city is without electricity. Evacuees sheltering in the sweltering heat of the Superdome were trying desperately to get bottles of water; a shopping cart full of orange juice would've been more valuable to take from a store than a flat screen TV. I remember seeing a video from inside a Whole Foods after Katrina; basic foodstuffs had been taken from the shelves but the cooler of fancy cheeses was largely untouched.

Katrina started as a natural disaster, but it was compounded by a man-made disaster. All levels of government failed the people of New Orleans. Mayor Ray Nagin avoided an evacuation order (worrying it would make him look bad if the storm didn't have a big impact) and did not have a plan to evacuate a city where many people don't own a car. Police, the military, and other government organizations treated the people of New Orleans as potential enemies rather than victims of a disaster that needed help. Police and soldiers essentially imprisoned New Orleanians in their own city, waist deep in water. George W. Bush had spent four years making sweeping changes to prevent another round of terrorist attacks, curtailing civil liberties and reorganizing every disaster-related agency into the Department of Homeland Security. Yet DHS failed miserably in its first trial in a real disaster; they'd focused so much on a threat model of foreign invaders yet were woefully unprepared for a city of people displaced by Mother Nature. Unlike 9/11 the media started asking tough questions about the government response to Katrina, leading to the resignation of unqualified FEMA director Michael Brown and the beginning of the crash in President Bush's popularity ratings that had been based in large part on his image as a protector of the nation. One might imagine a post-9/11 media narrative focused on resilient communities that prepare locally and remain resilient and resourceful in the face of tragedy.

The physical damage on 9/11 was very localized and most New Yorkers could return to something resembling normalcy within days or weeks. The World Trade Center and The Pentagon are symbolic and commercially valuable, so financial and organizational support for rebuilding was easy to come by. Hurricane Katrina destroyed infrastructure for more than a hundred miles along the coast of Louisiana and Mississippi. In many neighborhoods it took months or years for half of the residents to return from evacuation before they could even start rebuilding their homes, often with limited and frustrating government help. Here again civil society emerged to help people meet their basic needs more quickly and flexibly than official emergency response organizations could. Solnit reports that Camp Casey, Cindy Sheehan's protest community in front of President Bush's ranch (which had itself become a temporary community much like after a disaster) quickly decamped from Crawford, Texas and headed east to help the communities hit by Louisiana. She shares stories of the generosity of Rainbow Family members who arrived in Mississippi to share their experience building temporary sanitation, community kitchens, and spontaneous welcoming communities. (Burners Without Borders also came into existence as volunteers traveled straight from Burning Man to the Mississippi coast to help rebuild.) Community groups formed in New Orleans, providing basics like medical care and construction tools while also fighting for the rights of long-time residents as elites and outside parties sought to rid the city of public housing and other social infrastructure.

I had started reading A Paradise Built in Hell hoping for a perspective on the unfolding disaster. COVID-19 was in many ways the inverse of the disasters described in the book. Instead of everyone in a city simultaneously experiencing a sudden tragic event, the pandemic quickly jumped from hotspot lockdowns in Wuhan, Northern Italy, and New York to worldwide "safer at home" orders. Everyone in one house could die of COVID without anyone else on the street realizing anything was wrong. Rather than gathering with our neighbors in the streets and pulling strangers out of collapsed buildings we tried hard not to get within six feet of our neighbors. Instead of a city cut off from communication, experiencing a very different world than the media's rumor-fed narrative of chaos and looting, hundreds of millions of people spent hours a day sheltered in their living rooms feeding on COVID stories from around the world. And despite the constant stream of bleak news, uplifting stories spread as well: a video of a cute lockdown craft project could easily garner a few million views. The ubiquity of recording technology and easy Internet sharing helped everyone find connection in a shared experience: "the famous TV host is working from their living room table, just like me." As in physical disasters, generosity flowed from ordinary people, giving money, dropping off groceries for elderly neighbors, and providing emotional support video conferences. But without a physical shared experience the COVID disaster area turned into social conflict that wasn't typical of disaster communities. Acts of survival like wearing a mask and avoiding large gatherings became flashpoints of cultural conflict, seen by some as effective defense against an invisible hazard and by others as a government attempt at control. As in the disasters in the book, governments in 2020 were generally not well prepared to handle the situation, but it's unlikely that the people left to their own devices would've fared better: fighting an ongoing airborne disease requires coordinated social action, unlike the localized and improvised action needed to help people in a neighborhood that just collapsed.

A Paradise Built in Hell is a book about specific disasters and the communities that arose there. It's also a book about human nature, the human capacity for spontaneous generosity, and the wonderful connection and lack of hierarchy in disaster communities. It's a book about the incorrect assumptions people—especially elites with more to lose in a disrupted society—make about how people will behave without government authority and established social structure. And it's a book about transformation, people whose lives changed from being in a disaster or by coming to help people out of one.
flwyd: (raven temple of moon)
An endless fiesta would be exhausting and demoralizing: the pleasure would go out of it, the masks would disguise only fatigue and apathy, and there would eventually be nothing to celebrate. The ordinary and the extraordinary need each other, or rather everyday life needs to be interrupted from time to time—which is not to say that we need disaster, only that it sometimes supplies the interruption in which the other work of society is done. Carnival and revolution are likewise interruptions of everyday life, but their point is to provide something that allows you to return to that life with more power, more solidarity, more hope. -- Rebecca Solnit, Paradise Built in Hell


At temporary events like Burning Man and Dragonfest I've often heard someone say something like "We should create a community where we do this year round." This quote refutes the idea much more eloquently than I have.
flwyd: (Vigelandsparken face to face)
Religions are moral exoskeletons. If you live in a religious community, you are enmeshed in a set of norms, relationships, and institutions that work primarily on the elephant to influence your behavior. But if you are an atheist living in a looser community with a less binding moral matrix, you might have to rely somewhat more on an internal moral compass, read by the rider. That might sound appealing to rationalists, but it is also a recipe for anomie—Durkheim's word for what happens to a society that no longer has a shared moral order. (It means, literally, “normlessness.”) We evolved to live, trade, and trust within shared moral matrices. When societies lose their grip on individuals, allowing all to do as they please, the result is often a decrease in happiness and an increase in suicide, as Durkheim showed more than a hundred years ago.

Societies that forgo the exoskeleton of religion should reflect carefully on what will happen to them over several generations. We don’t really know, because the first atheistic socieites have only emerged in Europe in the last few decades. They are the least efficient societies every known at turning resources (of which they have a lot) into offspring (of which they have few).
— Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion, "Religion is a Team Sport."

While many European countries have low native birthrates, the successful ones have high immigration rates. I see this as a transitional phase in group selection. Haidt argues that religious communities and practices are a group adaptation: groups of humans with a strong religious bond are able to overcome free rider problems and outcompete—as a group—groups which are less cohesive or whose cultural practices are less effective at bringing collaboration to fruition. For most of human history, one's membership in a religious group was generally from life through death: leaving a religious group meant leaving a tribe, or having a conquering tribe's religious system forcibly replace the conquered tribes.

But now large group "superorganisms" (including religions, nations, governments, and companies) don't have to be tied to a human lifecycle. In the 21st Century, humans have considerable ability to move between groups. Much as an animal organism doesn't die as its cells come and go at a steady pace, a paper entity can grow and thrive so long as it can get a continual influx of new resources, even if those resources shift focus to providing outcomes beneficial to the group rather than reproducing on their own. This is particularly true for companies: two parents often work for different companies; a baby born to the couple is not generally part of either company's culture; and there's no assumption that the child will grow up to be part of the company as an adult. Workers might be part of a company for a few months or a few years (and rarely more than half their lives), yet companies like IBM and UBS are older than roughly half of the countries in the UN.
flwyd: (Om Chomsky)
I started reading Paul Graham when he wrote A Plan for Spam, and I wrote a masters' thesis examining several variants on Bayesian spam filtering. He generally writes insightful articles about creating tech startups, in large part because he's a domain expert on startup companies.

Graham's latest essay, on income equality is, however, mostly useless. (Perhaps because he's writing about economics and society, about which he is not a domain expert.) He published a simplified version of his argument boils down to the claim that economic inequality is purely a measurement and an outcome. He argues that economic inequality is not inherently bad and that we should instead focus on the problematic subset of causes of inequality. There's a grain of truth in this, but Graham totally ignores the outbound edges from economic inequality in the graph of social ills.

Some specific fallacies in Graham's essay:
Straw man
Graham seems to be arguing against the position that less wealth inequality is always better than more inequality. The end state of such a position is zero inequality, in which all people have the same amount of wealth, which is basically extreme communism. He says "You can't end economic inequality without preventing people from getting rich, and you can't do that without preventing them from starting startups." I'm not aware of anyone who actually holds that position. Even the Occupy Wall St. movement, a melting pot of some fairly radical ideas, wasn't advocating for the top 1% to hold precisely 1% of the wealth; they just thought the richest 1% should own significantly less than 50% of the wealth. The non-vacuous position Graham fails to argue against is the case for reducing income equality, not eliminating income equality.
Anecdotal fallacy
The long version of Graham's essay focuses on startup founders, with Mark Zuckerberg (Facebook founder) and Larry Page (Google founder) as anecdotes. Startup founders are probably disproportionately represented in the top 20 billionaires, but I suspect that they make up a smaller fraction of the full 1% cohort. Even if, as Graham argues, major wealth acquisition for startup founders is socially beneficial, that does little to support his argument that income inequality in general isn't problematic if most of the wealth is concentrated in non-startup hands. Graham's reliance on anecdote is so strong in this piece that he dismisses economic statistics as a way to analyze the situation.
Appeal to consequences
Graham suggests that reducing economic inequality would reduce or eliminate startup culture. Graham basically takes it as a given that startups are good, and therefore concludes that attacking economic inequality would be bad. There is plenty of room for both. Furthermore, startups might not contribute that much to wealth inequality. Initial startup funding generally comes from venture capital firms and individual wealthy investors. A moderately successful startup typically gets bought by a larger company, enriching the initial investors, the founders and early employees, and potentially the shareholders of the purchasing company (if the market reacts positively to the news). Wildly successful startups usually create wealthy founders when the company goes public and the stock market places a high value on the company. In both of these cases, the story is mostly about the already wealthy moving money around, some of which goes to a relatively small number of previously-not-wealthy folks. Even here, Graham doesn't address whether the existing wealth disparity between successful founders, ordinary tech workers, and folks in less-lucrative is better or worse than other potential wealth distributions. Should employees hold a greater fraction of startup shares? Should IPOs be taxed to support poverty reduction efforts? Graham's essay gives no guidance on such matters.

Graham's essay proposes an odd argument of inevitability, too. He cites the exponential curve of technological growth as evidence that economic inequality has historically and will continue to grow exponentially. This seems factually inaccurate: the western has significantly less wealth inequality today than it did under feudalism. I suspect too that technological and economic progress in the post-war era was greatly facilitated by the destruction of significant amounts of wealth which (naturally) disproportionately impacted the rich.

Graham points out the "pie fallacy"–that there's a fixed amount of wealth to go around–and spends much of the essay talking about creating wealth. However, he ignores the fact that many important components of wealth are finite resources for which pie-division is a very important concern. The most notable of these is land, a finite resource whose supply and demand imbalance is being felt particularly acutely in Paul Graham's back yard: Silicon Valley where even educated and skilled workers are finding it difficult to afford housing. A more subtle somewhat-finite resource is consumers. A society in which few people have disposable income is one in which building new enterprises becomes increasingly tough. The lower rate of income inequality in post-war America is an important example (though Graham tries to dismiss it) because well-payed workers play an important ecological role in a growing economy, providing a wide base which can buy new products in turn funding the creation of more new products. Perhaps such an arrangement is unstable: from a relatively equal distribution wealth will naturally accumulate with the institutions and individuals who reliably generate successful business. But perhaps there's another part of that natural cycle in which the wealth becomes too concentrated and the system destabilizes, leading to destruction and redistribution of wealth, starting the cycle anew. If that's the case, should we pursue a "controlled burn" approach of intentional wealth redistribution or should we follow a "forest fire" approach when wealth redistribution comes with little warning and dramatic upheaval?
flwyd: (tell tale heart)
I added [livejournal.com profile] tongodeon as a friend because he created the Red Meat Constructor Set, but his journal is regularly full of insightful political and social commentary and well-written amusing anecdotes.

His views on holiday shopping are quite similar to mine.

Nobody should feel obliged for social or personal reasons to give me a gift. If you would like to do something nice for me, invite me over for tea and games. If you have money you would like to spend so that I will appreciate your generosity, make a donation to KGNU, ACLU, EFF, WikiMedia, or an open source project of your choice. If you find an object you know I would appreciate owning, I thank you for your generosity.

If I don't give you a gift it's because I didn't know what you could use and/or figured you could use the resources you would ordinarily expend in acquiring a gift for me could be more efficiently be used by you to get something you actually need.

If you would like a winter holiday-themed physical greeting from me, provide your postal address and which winter occasion you most enjoy celebrating. (I'm leaving comments public on this post, so if you don't want stalkers to find you, send your address to tstone (a) trevorstone.org.)

I make an exception for white elephants in which everyone finds something they already own, have fun wrapping it, have fun watching other people unwrap it, have fun stealing presents, and go home with an object they don't need but can appreciate (at least ironically).
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